Friday, January 8, 2010

Don't Overlook the Recent Rally in Securities Lending

Securities lending programs became increasingly popular during the last decade among many investment companies (mutual funds, ETF's, pensions, endowments). Long-only funds, pensions, and endowments were attracted to the incremental income from lending securities which otherwise remained invested? The demand from certain hedge funds and other speculators with shorting selling strategies made such programs all the more worthwhile. In addition, custodians of the securities also got a chance to earn additional fees for providing the service.

As with many other investment trends in the last decade, the music for securities lending abruptly stopped playing around the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Interestingly, the reason for losses was not specifically related to the securities which were lent. Except in the case of securities held in accounts at Lehman Brothers, securities generally could be recalled by the lender. Instead, investment companies which lent their securities suffered losses from supposedly safe short-term securities using the cash collateral from borrowers. Regrettably, the securities lending transaction added counterparty risk and collateral price risk in exchange for a fee which probably did not fully compensate the lender for these risks.

The web is filled with ample explanations of how these lending programs worked, and the media diligently covered the losses on reinvested collateral (and also popularized the SIV acronym). The immediate purpose of this posting is to provide a simple graphical perspective on securities lending activity among registered investment companies.

Using SEC filings from primarily mutual funds and ETF's, we can get a 50,000-foot view of securities lending activity. Starting in 2007, funds pulled back their level of lending activity in order to re-assess the risks and protect against further unforeseen losses on reinvested collateral. The interesting observation from the following graphs is the apparent recovery in lending activity.

Please note two important caveats concerning the data behind these graphs.

1. Investment companies disclosed their policy to lend securities, specifically whether lending was allowed and whether it occurred during each reporting period. However, the data does not reflect exactly how much of the securities were actually loaned out. Of course, if an investment company had a policy to not allow securities lending or did not engage in the practice, then we assume no securities were lent.
2. The data has a few months lag. The graphs cover a period through June 2009, but the sample during the second quarter of 2009 gets thin and leaves open the possibility of material restatement as more data arrives. To gauge the sample size, refer to the dollar amount of sampled portfolios is displayed underneath the months along the horizontal axis.

Starting from December 2003, the following graphs (separately for equity-dominated portfolios and debt-dominated portfolios) show the overall mix of securities across the following three categories:

1. Fund policy did not permit lending out securities during the reporting period.
2. Fund policy did permit lending out securities but was not engaged in lending any during the reporting period.
3. Fund policy did permit lending out securities and was engaged in lending some amount of them during the reporting period.

Here are three graphs for equity funds, looking at the trend according to total assets (AUM), average AUM per fund, and number of funds.


Securities Lending - Registered Investment Companies - Equity Funds - Total AUM

Securities Lending - Registered Investment Companies - Equity Funds - Count

Securities Lending - Registered Investment Companies - Equity Funds - Average AUM

The green bars are intentionally placed underneath the yellow bars. The height of the combined green and yellow bars corresponds roughly to the capacity for lending activity, so hence the green bars are a gauge for how much this capacity was utilized.

The return of securities lending does not appear to be consistent across the population. While lending utilization based on total AUM has been trending upwards since January 2009 (first graph), the number of funds participating in this rebound has been trending downwards (second graph), albeit the pace of decline in 2009 is slower than in 2008. This divergent trends implies that funds lending securities are larger on average than previously. Furthermore, the third graphs shows that smaller funds which can lend securities do not exercise the privilege (yellow), when compared to larger funds (green).

Here are the same three graphs for bond funds.







For bond funds, the trends are consistent across the board. In terms of total AUM and number of funds, securities lending utilization has trended upwards during 2009 to historic highs. When looking at the population based on the average AUM, those funds lending securities appear to be increasingly smaller than those which do not authorize the practice. Given the challenges in managing and monitoring a securities lending program, one might have expected larger bond funds to be more engaged in the practice. However, smaller bond funds may be relying on their custodian banks or third parties to manage the programs, hence not impacted by internal resource constraints.

Finally, one obvious and expected outcome from this analysis: equity funds have consistently engaged in securities lending much more than bond funds. Hedge funds which borrow securities probably engage in long/short trading strategies, but if trading in bonds becomes more electronic or hedge funds investors seek more opportunities in less liquid markets, bond funds might gain a performance edge on their competitors by supplementing returns with lending revenues.

Check back in the future for updates of these graphs and possibly other breakdowns, such as passive vs active strategy, custodian specific, and fund complex. Feel free to post or email other suggestions for assessing these trends.

Further reading:

Wall Street Journal: Is Your Fund Pawning Shares at Your Expense?

Wall Street Journal: Getting a Fair Share from ETFs

The Motley Fool: The Risky Business of Securities Lending

Monday, November 30, 2009

Cost Basis Reporting: impact on TA systems, if any

The Emergency Economic Stabilizaton Act of 2008 consists of a tax provision which requires brokers to report extensive cost basis information to the IRS and investors. Investors who received past gain/loss statements from their brokers should realize that these statements were not reported directly to the IRS. As a result, this provision brings cost basis reporting for tax purposes to an entirely new level.

In just over two years, starting on January 1, 2012, brokers and their transfer agents will be required to track and report gains/losses for mutual fund transactions in much greater detail than currently required. The deadline for stock transactions is actually one year earlier: January 1, 2011. Experts in the industry are saying that any brokerage which has not started planning for the systems impact is already behind schedule.

There is no shortage of articles highlighting the need to take action and vendors touting potential solutions. One major class of solutions aims to import data from existing transaction processing systems and compute the required cost basis information for investors and the IRS. Approaching the problem as only a reporting challenge has its appeals, probably foremost for cost and expediency. Recoding a transfer agency system during a recessionary period (or anytime, for that matter) ranks up there with persuading Americans to agree on healthcare reform.

With respect to mutual funds, transfer agency shareholder recording systems ("TA systems"), from vendors such as DST, PNC, SunGard, and Envision, generally follow fundamental rules when tracking sharelots. (For those wondering, assume a sharelot to represent the most basic level of tracking an investment in a stock, ETF, mutual fund, bond, etc. on a TA system.) The following such rules apply to a single account ("account-level processing").

1. When an investor purchases shares in a mutual fund, a sharelot is created on the trade date of the investment. If for some reason multiple purchase orders for the same fund occur on the same trade date, the TA system might consolidate those orders under one sharelot.
2. When an investor sells/redeems shares in a mutual fund, the balance of an existing sharelot is reduced by the size of the sell order as of trade date. The choice of which existing sharelot to reduce depends on various rules, usually chosen by the mutual fund (hopefully disclosed in the corresponding Prospectus or Statement of Additional Information.)
3. When an investor reinvests a dividend into a mutual fund (not necessarily the same fund which paid the dividend), the balance of a sharelot created specifically for reinvested dividends is increased. Generally, every reinvestment trade does not create a new sharelot (but, as with everything related to transaction processing, exceptions may exist).
4. The purchase or sale of mutual fund shares as part of an exchange (selling one fund and using proceeds to purchase another) is handled no differently. Sharelots are reduced and created accordingly. However, other rules may take into account special redemption fees, front-end loads, or commissions, for which additional sharelots might be required in order to facilitate computations.
5. Moving shares from one account to another (i.e. changing brokers) generally has no impact on the sharelots, should not result in a taxable event, and should not change the cost basis. However, brokers need to be certain to transfer the sharelot data properly across systems. A surprising portion of account transfers require human intervention, such as sending/receiving faxes and manual data entry.

What might the new cost basis reporting requirements mean for mutual fund transactions and share balances recorded on TA systems, and their users? Here are a few potential repercussions to consider.

1. Systems which follow certain rules for processing sell orders might need to accommodate other rules required under the tax provision.
Simple FIFO or LIFO no longer suffices. Investors will have the option to select which rules to
follow, even change selections over time.

2. The reinvestment of dividends may require the creation of more sharelots in order to track each individual reinvestment transaction. The IRS will require brokers to compute the gain/loss for each set of shares purchased, regardless of whether an investor used cash or dividend distributions to fund the purchase.
3. Wash sales occur when identical shares (the true meaning of which may be pending clarification) are purchased within 30 days before or after being sold. If a taxable loss is realized when shares are sold, the corresponding purchase would require an adjustment to the sharelot cost basis. Not all TA systems may handle this adjustment automatically.

These are only a few considerations, and future postings on this blog may introduce more. Keep in mind that the impact on TA systems might be minimal if adopting the new cost basis reporting requirements is defined as a reporting challenge. As brokers plan various solutions in coordination with technology vendors, will the underlying data architecture and trade processing code in TA systems remain largely insulated?

Check future postings for an ongoing assessment of operational considerations and hopefully some quantitative simulations of the potential tax impact.

Friday, November 20, 2009

Treasury TGP = Sticky Situation

In the last two postings, I discussed how the Treasury's Temporary Guarantee Program (TGP) for supporting money market funds favored shareholders who held positions on or prior to September 19, 2008 (the "Cut-Off Date"). The TGP served to preserve the perceived safety of participating money market funds for existing covered investors and possibly new uninsured investors.

More specifically, the TGP offered money market funds a few key competitive advantages.

1. Normally, FDIC-insured bank deposits are the dominant means for saving cash under a federal guarantee program. The TGP placed money market funds on a more even playing field, which probably was merited given the alternative of having investors en masse pull out of money markets funds. In response, the American Bankers Association warned that investors would be encouraged to withdraw bank deposits to take advantage of the TGP. As a result of this concern, the Treasury decided to limit the guarantee to shares held as of the Cut-Off Date.
2. If investors wanted to transfer funds out of a money market fund after the Cut-Off Date, the guarantee would cease to apply to the transferred funds. However, it seems that an investor could transfer funds back into the same money market fund and continue to benefit from TGP coverage up to the eligible balance as of Cut-Off Date. Therefore, money market funds became a convenient place to park funds (a sort of "safe haven") any time investors became worried about systemic risk in other assets or markets.
3. The "safe haven" status might have also encouraged investors to stay in a specific fund family. In other words, an investor could hop around different mutual funds within the same fund family where the money market fund provided coverage under the TGP. A decision to switch to another fund family would most likely involve a choice to close an account and abandon the insurance, unless an investor was a shareholder in money market funds at multiple fund families. As long as an investor never closed an account which provided coverage under the TGP ("Covered Account"), he/she could have transferred funds in and out of that account without losing the applicable insurance.
Given the last item, fund sponsors probably benefited from the "non-portability" of TGP insurance. (Remember when cell phone numbers in the U.S. could not be transferred between different carriers?) In contrast, FDIC insurance was always "portable", because the FDIC would insure bank deposits regardless of when and from where the money arrived. Although the Treasury specified a Cut-Off Date to prevent investors from moving their funds out of seemingly weaker institutions into safer money market funds, the Cut-Off Date and customer service representatives probably encouraged investors to think twice before leaving a fund family.

Combined with numerous press releases announcing participation in the TGP, marketing departments at fund families were handed a powerful tool for mitigating customer attrition - and possibly attracting new customers and assets (see "Exposed Assets" in the November 13 posting).